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Made in Europe: Who Qualifies, and Who Pays?

Writer: Paul Bennett
Paul Bennett
Oct 12
11 min read

Europe has spent three years diagnosing its automotive problem. In March, the European Commission finally wrote a prescription. The Industrial Accelerator Act, published on 4 March 2026, is the first serious attempt to define in law what a “European car” actually is, and then to tie public money to that definition. It is not a tariff, and it is not a ban on imports. It is something more subtle and, for those of us who finance, lease and remarket vehicles, potentially more consequential: a qualification test that decides which cars get to sit at the subsidised table.


The Act has not yet passed. Parliament’s co-rapporteurs only presented their joint draft report on 28 September, and the Council is still working towards a common view. But the shape of the rules is now clear enough to plan around, and the fight over the detail shows where the money and the risk will land. So this week’s Auto Pulse Europe asks two blunt questions. Who qualifies? And who pays?


For anyone funding vehicles, the Industrial Accelerator Act automotive provisions raise live questions: what Made in Europe EV rules mean in practice, how EU local content requirements for electric vehicles and EU battery origin requirements will be measured, where Chinese EV makers stand on EU public procurement, and what EU CO2 super-credits for small EVs will reward. The question I think the industry has not yet priced is what EU origin does to residual value.


What Is the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act and What Does It Mean for Cars?


The Industrial Accelerator Act is the Commission’s proposal to define a “European car” in law and tie public money to that definition. Its vehicle rules rest on three tests: final assembly in the EU, at least 70% EU-origin component value excluding the battery, and, three years after publication, a 50% threshold for designated critical components. Batteries have their own track.


What the Commission Has Actually Proposed


As Skadden’s note on the proposal records, the Commission formally presented the Industrial Accelerator Act on 4 March 2026. Strip away the Brussels prose and the vehicle provisions rest on three tests. First, final assembly must take place in the Union. Second, at least 70% of the vehicle’s component value, excluding the battery, must be of European origin, measured using non-preferential rules of origin, from day one. Third, three years after publication, a 50% threshold applies to designated critical components.


The Battery Track and the CO2 Super-Credit Lever


Batteries get their own track. Six months after entry into force, three battery components, including the cells, would need to be of EU origin. After three years that rises to five, with the battery management system and cathode active material named alongside the cells. T&E’s analysis of the battery-component phase-in, rising to five components including cells, cathode material and battery management systems by 2030 sets out the same timetable. Anyone who has looked at where Europe’s cell and cathode capacity actually stands will see how ambitious that is.


The scope covers battery-electric, plug-in hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles. The trigger is public money: public procurement, and public support schemes for buying or using a vehicle. Member states would have to apply the criteria to the whole national budget covered by the relevant annex. There are escape valves. Authorities can step away from the rules where the price gap exceeds 25% in procurement or 30% in support schemes, or where compliance would mean a delay of more than seven months.


Alongside the Act sits a second lever, in the December 2025 revision of the CO2 standards for cars and vans. That package replaced the hard 2035 zero-emission requirement with a 90% exhaust reduction, and it introduced super-credits for small zero-emission cars “made in the EU”. The catch, already raised by member states in Council, is that the eligibility criteria for those super-credits are left to a future delegated act. Manufacturers are being asked to make product and sourcing decisions now against a definition that does not yet exist.


Who Qualifies: The 70% Question


Seventy per cent sounds demanding, but the unions say it is not. IndustriAll Europe points to Joint Research Centre work showing that 80-85% of inputs used to build vehicles in the EU are already sourced in Europe. On that reading, 70% is a floor set below the waterline, one that most European-built cars would clear without changing a single supplier contract. The unions also cite GERPISA estimates suggesting that generous calculation methods could push effective local content down to 55-60%.


Carmakers and Suppliers Push in Different Directions


The carmakers see it the other way. ACEA supports the objective but objects to counting value component by component, arguing that “a vehicle is far more than the sum of its parts”. Their point has some substance. Engineering, software, assembly, testing and brand are value added in Europe, and a parts-only method undercounts them. ACEA also wants the benefits of qualifying to be big enough to cover the real cost of localising, and it wants the rules tailored separately for cars, vans, trucks and buses. That last point is not academic. Reporting on the proposal suggests around half of medium and heavy trucks could fail the current tests.


The suppliers, through CLEPA, broadly back the 70% and critical-component thresholds. Their worry runs the other way: that the definition of “trusted trade partners” leaks, and that incentives limited to public procurement are too narrow to matter. Valeo, Bosch, Forvia, Schaeffler and ZF have urged Paris and Berlin to push for a tougher Act, not a softer one. When the supply base is asking for stricter rules than its customers, the stakes have shifted.


Who Qualifies: Why the Map Matters as Much as the Maths


The percentage gets the headlines. The geography may matter more. Where does “Europe” end for the purposes of counting content? The positions are strikingly far apart.


France argues the Commission’s draft is too loose, because it risks extending European origin to dozens of countries with EU trade agreements. Renault, Stellantis and Volkswagen, together around 60% of EU output, have proposed a 70% threshold counting the EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. ACEA as a body wants EU27 plus the UK, with targeted protection for existing European investments in Turkey and Morocco. IndustriAll would accept EU27, EFTA, the UK and candidate countries that have properly transposed EU law, and it would explicitly exclude cars built in special economic zones elsewhere. Turkey is lobbying to be in. Japanese and British producers have made similar demands.


For UK readers, this is the paragraph that matters most. Britain’s car plants are deeply embedded in the European supply chain, and UK content counting as European could decide whether a Sunderland-built EV or a Midlands-sourced drivetrain helps or hinders a model’s eligibility. The UK is not at the negotiating table, so its manufacturers are relying on allies who are.


Where Chinese Brands Fit


It would be naive to read the Act as anything other than a response to Chinese competition, but it is a more sophisticated response than a tariff. It does not stop a Chinese brand selling in Europe. It decides whether that brand can win a public fleet tender or attract a national purchase incentive.


That creates a clear incentive to localise, and the leading Chinese manufacturers have already moved. BYD’s assembly plant in Hungary and Chery’s arrangement in Barcelona are the obvious early contenders. But assembly is the easy part. Parliament has noticed the same weakness: lawmakers warn ‘Made in Europe’ could become meaningless if firms import valuable components and only finish assembly in the EU. A plant that bolts together imported cells, battery packs and electronics will struggle against a 70% value test, and the battery-component clock will bite within months of entry into force. The Act’s investment chapter adds another layer: foreign investments above EUR100 million in batteries, EVs and related components, from countries holding more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity, face conditions. IndustriAll wants those conditions tightened on ownership, intellectual property, R&D and local sourcing.


The likely result is a two-speed Chinese presence rather than exclusion. Brands that commit to European supply chains will qualify, perhaps more convincingly than some legacy European models built on imported cells. Brands that treat Europe as an export market will compete on price in the private retail channel, which is still the larger part of the market. This is the choice behind the detail. As we’ve argued before, Europe has to decide what it wants from Chinese manufacturing investment, and the Act is the first law to force the question.


Who Pays: Following the Money


Every local content rule is, at heart, a transfer. Someone accepts a higher price so that someone else keeps a factory open. The question is who ends up holding the bill.


The first payer is the taxpayer and the public buyer. If a qualifying European EV costs more than an imported equivalent, public authorities and fleet buyers pay the difference, up to the 25-30% gap at which they are allowed to walk away. That is a meaningful premium, deliberately sized to keep European production competitive in public channels.


The second payer is the manufacturer that cannot qualify quickly. Re-sourcing cells, cathode material and battery management systems is a multi-year capital programme, not a procurement memo. Some programmes will lose eligibility for public channels in the interim. Others will absorb higher component costs to stay in, and that margin has to come from somewhere.


The third payer, less obviously, is the private buyer. If qualifying vehicles are steered into subsidised public and incentivised channels, manufacturers will try to recover localisation costs across the whole range. Private retail customers who receive no subsidy may still help fund the premium.


Why Finance and Leasing Should Care Now


This is where the policy debate tends to go quiet, and where Auto Pulse Europe readers should pay closest attention. “Made in Europe” status becomes an asset attribute, and asset attributes move residual values. EV residual values are already becoming harder to model, and origin status adds another variable.


Consider a public-sector or incentive-backed fleet. A model that qualifies keeps access to procurement and support schemes. A near-identical model that falls short loses it, perhaps abruptly if the battery-component deadline catches a programme mid-cycle. Demand in that channel shifts, registrations shift with it, and so do the used-car supply curves three or four years out. Residual-value setters who treat two similar EVs as interchangeable may find the market has quietly priced in their eligibility status.


There is also a definitional risk that lenders understand only too well. A rule that hangs on a delegated act yet to be written, an origin methodology still being negotiated and a geographic scope that might or might not include the UK or Turkey is a rule with tail risk built in. If a lessor writes a five-year contract today, that vehicle will be remarketed into a market shaped by rules that do not yet exist. Guaranteed future values and balloon payments need to reflect that uncertainty.


Captives, Credit Committees and the Data Layer


Captives have a particular exposure. Where a captive finance arm is supporting a brand’s push into public and corporate fleets, eligibility for “Made in Europe” status may become part of the sales pitch, and a commercial commitment. Credit committees should ask the product teams a simple question: what happens to this book if the model loses, or never gains, qualifying status? Origin rules touch every part of the Five Rs framework: residuals, regulation, rates, retention and remarketing, which is why they belong in the credit committee and not only in the compliance team.


And there is an operational point. Proving origin is a data problem. Fleet buyers, public authorities and their funders will need documentary evidence that a vehicle qualified at the point of purchase, and possibly over its life. Expect origin certification to join emissions data and battery health in the vehicle record. Lenders and lessors who build that data into their systems early will find tenders easier to win and disputes easier to defend.


The Politics: Paris, Berlin and the Clock


At the 26th Franco-German Ministerial Council on 17 July, the two governments committed to a joint position on the automotive package and its “Made in Europe” provisions by the end of summer. Summer has ended. Whatever Paris and Berlin settle on will carry decisive weight, and the most telling shift is in Berlin. Germany was long hostile to “buy European” rules. It has softened as its car industry has shed jobs.


The likely landing zone is a 70% headline figure, a tighter geographic definition than the Commission proposed, some recognition of manufacturer value added, and a softer, more phased battery timetable. The super-credit delegated act is the sleeper issue. It could quietly shape small-car strategy for the rest of the decade.


Five Things to Do Before the Ink Dries


  • Map your exposure. Identify which models in your funded or leased portfolio depend on public procurement or purchase incentives, and estimate their likely qualification status under both the Commission text and a stricter Franco-German version.

  • Stress-test residuals. Run scenarios in which non-qualifying EVs lose a share of fleet demand, and in which qualifying models command a modest premium. The gap need not be large to matter across a book.

  • Ask the manufacturers. Request battery-component sourcing roadmaps from OEM partners. Cells, cathode material and battery management systems are the critical path, not assembly.

  • Watch the UK and Turkey clauses. For UK-based funders and suppliers, the geographic definition is the single most important variable in the whole file.

  • Build the data layer. Treat origin evidence as part of the asset file from day one. It will be cheaper than reconstructing it at the point of a tender or a remarketing dispute.


The Bottom Line


Europe has finally decided that where a car is made should matter as much as what it costs. That is a defensible choice, and arguably an overdue one. But a qualification test is only as strong as its definitions, and those definitions are still being fought over: which percentage, which countries, which components and which deadlines.


For carmakers, the answer to “who qualifies?” will be decided by sourcing decisions made over the next 24 months. For those of us in finance and leasing, the answer to “who pays?” is already partly visible. It is whoever priced the residual without asking where the battery came from.


Talk to Paul Bennett


If you fund, lease or remarket vehicles, how will your book stand up if origin rules reach your models? Paul Bennett, Managing Partner at Madox Square, works with lenders, lessors and captives on residual value, regulation and remarketing strategy. Connect with Paul on LinkedIn and send a short note on what you are looking at, or speak to usto start the conversation.


Frequently Asked Questions


1.What is the Industrial Accelerator Act? 

It is a Commission proposal, presented on 4 March 2026, that ties public procurement and public support schemes to EU-origin criteria in sectors including cars and batteries. It is not a tariff or an import ban. Cars that fail the tests can still be sold in the EU but would miss out on the relevant subsidies and public contracts.


2.How much EU content must a “Made in Europe” EV have? 

The proposal requires final assembly in the EU and at least 70% EU-origin component value, excluding the battery, from day one. The battery needs at least three EU-origin components including the cells, rising to five, with cathode active material and battery management systems added, by 2030. A 50% threshold for designated critical components follows three years after publication.


3.Will the Industrial Accelerator Act affect used EV residual values? 

Very likely. “Made in Europe” status becomes an asset attribute. A model that loses eligibility loses public and incentive-backed demand, which shifts registrations and the used supply three or four years later. With the rules still being negotiated, guaranteed future values and balloon payments should allow for that uncertainty.


4.Can Chinese EV makers still sell in the EU under the Act?

 Yes. The Act does not ban imports. It decides whether a brand can win a public fleet tender or attract a national purchase incentive. Brands that localise assembly and supply chains, such as BYD in Hungary and Chery in Barcelona, can qualify, but a plant that bolts together imported cells and electronics will struggle against the 70% test.


5.Has the Industrial Accelerator Act passed? 

No. Parliament’s co-rapporteurs presented their joint draft report on 28 September, and the Council is still working towards a common view. Skadden’s note on the proposal does not expect final adoption before mid to late 2027.

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