Europe at a Crossroads: The Automotive Industry's Battle Against Accelerated Electrification and Chinese Competition

Updated: Aug 10
The EU 2035 combustion engine ban Germany fought to soften officially changed on 16 December 2025, when Brussels replaced the original zero-emission mandate with a 90 per cent CO2 reduction target. That outcome traces directly back to a formal letter Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 28 November 2025, pushing for exactly this kind of technology-neutral flexibility. This is the story of why Germany pushed, what it actually asked for, and how the EU's December 2025 Automotive Package changed the rules for every European manufacturer, and every Chinese competitor, racing to win the next decade of the continent's car market.
Why Did Germany Push Back on the EU's 2035 Combustion Engine Ban?
Germany pushed back because the EU 2035 combustion engine ban Germany faced mandated a complete phaseout of new combustion-engine car sales, and German industry argued the timeline reflected political will rather than technological readiness or consumer demand. Chancellor Friedrich Merz submitted a formal letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's office on 28 November 2025, urging a technology-neutral approach that would let plug-in hybrids, range-extended EVs, and highly efficient combustion vehicles continue past 2035, arguing this could still meet climate goals while protecting European manufacturing jobs.
The Core Problem: A Mismatch Between Policy Ambition and Market Reality
The EU's original framework mandated zero-emission sales only by 2035, with the UK running an even more stringent 2030 deadline. While the policy reflected legitimate climate concerns, industry analysts argued the timeline reflected political ambition rather than technological or market readiness.
Three Compounding Gaps
The mismatch broke down into three connected problems. Consumers weren't entirely ready to make the switch, still weighing range anxiety, charging access and upfront cost against a familiar combustion alternative. Market infrastructure for electric vehicles remained underdeveloped in many regions, with charging networks lagging well behind the pace regulation assumed. And the entire automotive supply chain, from battery production to component manufacturing, lacked the capacity and maturity to support a transition moving this fast. Together, these gaps created a regulatory framework that threatened to handicap European manufacturers precisely when they could least afford it.
How Chinese Competition Changed the Calculation
What often went unstated in these policy discussions was the commercial reality driving much of Germany's urgency: Chinese automotive manufacturers were winning the race for market share in Europe outright. Chinese companies, with vertically integrated supply chains, lower labour costs and government backing, were flooding European markets with competitively priced EV, PHEV and ICE models simultaneously.
The numbers made the case on their own. Chinese-owned brands' market share across Europe rose from 2.9 per cent in May 2024 to 5.9 per cent in May 2025, a 103 per cent increase, according to JATO data. In the UK specifically, Chinese brand share climbed from 5.0 per cent in November 2024 to 13.0 per cent in November 2025, a 160 per cent increase. BYD was already in the later stages of building a production facility in Hungary, with a second facility scheduled for Turkey in 2026, and Leapmotor, via its Stellantis partnership, was set to open a Spanish factory the same year. European manufacturers faced a genuine pincer movement: strict EU regulation forcing a rapid transition on one side, and Chinese manufacturers establishing themselves as the dominant suppliers of exactly the products that regulation mandated, on the other.
The Employment Stakes: 2.3 Million Direct Jobs, 13 Million Including Supply Chain
The numbers behind European automotive jobs at risk EV transition told a sobering story. The European automotive industry directly employed approximately 2.3 million workers across manufacturing, engineering and support services. Counting the wider supply chain, that figure rose to roughly 13 million. Countries including Germany, Italy, Spain and France had entire communities economically dependent on automotive manufacturing.
Why This Isn't a Simple Retraining Problem
Unlike technology transitions in other sectors, automotive manufacturing couldn't simply be re-skilled overnight. Traditional engine manufacturing plants faced obsolescence, transmission specialists found their expertise suddenly redundant, and the extensive network of skilled trades that built Europe's automotive reputation over more than a century faced genuine displacement. The plants, the expertise and the supply chains were highly specialised and deeply embedded in regional economies, meaning the challenge was never simply replacing lost jobs, but doing so without devastating entire regions at once. A more gradual transition would have allowed workforce retraining, gradual facility conversion, and orderly supply chain restructuring. The original regulatory timeline allowed little room for any of that.
What Merz Actually Proposed: Technology-Neutral, Not Anti-Climate
Merz's letter proposed a genuinely calibrated position, not an abandonment of climate goals. Rather than focusing exclusively on eliminating combustion engines, he argued for a framework permitting plug-in hybrids, extended-range EVs, and highly efficient conventional vehicles to continue beyond 2035. He wasn't calling for a rejection of electrification. He was arguing for regulatory flexibility that would allow multiple pathways to emissions reduction while maintaining industrial viability and protecting employment, technology-neutral CO2 regulation automotive policy rather than a single mandated pathway.
The December 2025 Commission Package: What Actually Changed
On 16 December 2025, the European Commission delivered. The Automotive Package weakened the 2035 zero-emission target to a 90 per cent CO2 reduction target rather than 100 per cent, with the remaining 10 per cent compensated through low-carbon steel made in the EU or sustainable renewable fuels. Manufacturers also gained the ability to average emissions compliance between 2030 and 2032, easing the strict year-on-year targets that had required a 55 per cent reduction against 2021 levels. Van emissions targets were lowered from 50 to 40 per cent, reflecting slower EV adoption in that segment.
What the Commission Said
Climate Action Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra framed the package as a win-win: "We're staying the course towards zero-emissions mobility, but introducing some flexibilities for manufacturers to meet their CO2 targets in the most cost-efficient way." Senior EU lawmaker Manfred Weber had signalled the shift days earlier, confirming there would be no 100 per cent target from 2040 onwards either. Merz himself, present at the announcement, called it a matter of "technological openness," adding that the package gave "the industry real planning security." Reaction split predictably. E-Mobility Europe's Chris Heron warned the change would create investor uncertainty, arguing "what isn't settled is who will build it." The package also arrived alongside binding electrification targets for corporate fleets, a signal the Commission was still pushing EV adoption through a different lever even as it eased the combustion deadline itself.
Where European Automakers Stood: ACEA's Position
European automakers had long been unhappy with the EU's original timetable. Mercedes-Benz CEO Ola Kallenius, who chairs the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, ACEA Ola Kallenius emissions targets advocacy having been a consistent feature of industry lobbying, was among the most vocal advocates for revised CO2 rules allowing manufacturers more transition flexibility. Stellantis had warned the industry risked an "irreversible decline" without intervention, and Volkswagen argued that immovable targets no longer made sense, favouring market-driven timing over legislated deadlines.
The competitive disadvantage was particularly acute for manufacturers with deep roots in combustion technology. While Tesla and Chinese EV makers could design supply chains from scratch for electric production, established European manufacturers had to simultaneously manage the rundown of massive existing operations while building entirely new capabilities, a dual burden creating real financial stress and crowding out investment in the technologies needed to compete.
What This Means for Manufacturers, Workers and Regulators Now
The December 2025 package didn't resolve the underlying tension. It bought time. The EU had already shown a willingness to adjust before this point, having agreed earlier in 2024 to average 2025 CO2 targets over the 2025-2027 period rather than enforcing strict annual compliance, a modest concession that made this larger shift less surprising in hindsight than it might otherwise have seemed.
The broader context still matters here too. Germany's push for flexibility sat alongside creaking infrastructure, an ageing workforce, geopolitical uncertainty from the war in Ukraine, and the need to revive flagging economic growth. The automotive industry isn't merely an industrial sector. It's the backbone of European manufacturing competitiveness, a driver of technological innovation, export revenue and employment, and damage to it reverberates through the entire European economy. Whether European manufacturers can now navigate electrification while holding their position against Chinese rivals will depend on how effectively they use the breathing room this package actually bought them, not on the package alone.
Frequently Asked Questions
1.What did Merz ask the EU to change about the 2035 ban?
He asked for a technology-neutral approach allowing plug-in hybrids, extended-range EVs, and highly efficient combustion vehicles to continue past 2035, rather than a complete mandated phaseout to zero-emission vehicles only.
2.How many jobs depend on Europe's automotive industry? Approximately 2.3 million people are employed directly in manufacturing, engineering and support services, rising to roughly 13 million once the wider supply chain is included.
3.What is the EU's December 2025 automotive package?
Announced 16 December 2025, it weakened the 2035 target from 100 per cent zero-emission to a 90 per cent CO2 reduction, allowed the remaining 10 per cent to be offset via low-carbon steel or renewable fuels, and introduced emissions averaging between 2030 and 2032.
4.Did the EU actually soften the 2035 combustion engine ban?
Yes. The Commission's December 2025 Automotive Package replaced the 100 per cent zero-emission requirement with a 90 per cent CO2 reduction target, effectively ending the full combustion engine ban originally set for 2035.
5.How much market share have Chinese automakers gained in Europe?
Chinese-owned brands rose from 2.9 per cent to 5.9 per cent of the European market between May 2024 and May 2025, a 103 per cent increase, with UK-specific share climbing from 5.0 to 13.0 per cent over the same period, a 160 per cent increase.



